Administrative Law—Internal Revenue Code—Proof Required To Open a  Closed Year. —United States v. Powell by Desiderio, Robert J
Boston College Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 4 Article 18
7-1-1965
Administrative Law—Internal Revenue
Code—Proof Required To Open a "Closed
Year."—United States v. Powell
Robert J. Desiderio
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert J. Desiderio, Administrative Law—Internal Revenue Code—Proof Required To Open a "Closed Year."—United States v. Powell, 6
B.C.L. Rev. 922 (1965), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol6/iss4/18
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Administrative Law—Internal Revenue Code—Proof Required to Open
a "Closed Year."—United States v. Powel1. 1 —In March 1963, the Internal
Revenue Service, pursuant to Section 7602(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code, summoned Powell to appear before an agent to give testimony and
produce records relating to 1958 and 1959 returns of the William Penn
Laundry (taxpayer), of which Powell was president. The asserted basis for
the summons was fraud. Powell refused to produce the records. Because
taxpayer's returns had been once previously examined and because the
statute of limitations barred assessment of additional deficiencies for the
years in question except for fraud, Powell contended that before he could
be forced to produce the records the Service would have to indicate some
grounds for its belief that fraud had been committed. The agent declined
to give such information. Thereafter, the Service petitioned the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for enforcement of its ad-
ministrative summons. An affidavit was filed alleging (1) that the Service
had been investigating taxpayer's returns, (2) that the Regional Com-
missioner had determined that an additional examination was necessary
and had sent Powell a letter so stating, and (3) that the Service had reason
to suspect that the taxpayer had fraudulently falsified the returns. The
district court granted the agent an hour to re-examine taxpayer's records.
The court of appeals reversed? It concluded that the affidavit in itself was
not sufficient to satisfy its test of probable cause.a Certiorari was granted.*
HELD: The Internal Revenue Service need make no showing of probable
cause to suspect fraud for enforcement of an administrative summons unless
the taxpayer raises a substantial question that a judicial enforcement of the
summons would be an abusive use of the court's process, predicated upon
more than the fact of re-examination and the running of the statute of
limitations on ordinary tax liability.
The general authority of the Internal Revenue Service to audit a tax-
payer's return arises from Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. 5
Under that provision, the "Secretary or his delegate" can "examine any
books, papers, records. or other data"° or "summons the person . . to
produce" the same, and "to give such testimony ... as may be relevant or
material" to an authorized inquiry.? Such inquiry may be for the purpose of
(1) "ascertaining the correctness of any return," (2) "making a return
where none has been made," (3) "determining the liability of any person
for any internal revenue tax," or (4) "collecting any such liability." Two
1 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1963),
3
 Ibid.
4
 United States v. Powell, 377 U.S. 929 (1964).
3
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602(1).
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602(2).
8
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602. Under section 7604(a), the United States district
courts have jurisdiction to enforce a summons issued pursuant to section 7602(2). Section
7604(b) gives the district courts the power to hold for contempt any person who con-
tumaciously refused to obey such summons. Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 448
(1964).
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limitations, however, have been imposed upon this investigative power.
First, section 6501(a) limits the time within which the amount of any ordinary
tax liability may be assessed to three years.° If a tax cannot be assessed, it
logically follows that an investigation from which the assessment would
result, cannot be conducted. In the case of fraud, however, time in no way
bars investigation. Under section 6501(c), a "tax may be assessed, or a
proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assess-
ment, at any time."'" Secondly, section 7605(b)" imposes two further
restrictions upon the power granted by section 7602.' 2 The first clause of
this section is prohibitive in nature; it forbids the commencement of any
unnecessary examination or investigation of a taxpayer. This is so whether
the books of the taxpayer or of a third person are summoned.'" The second
clause, on the other hand, is more restrictive. It allows only one inspection
of a taxpayer's books of account for each taxable year unless the Regional
Commissioner, "after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in writing that an
additional inspection is necessary. "14
In the instant case, the Court rejected any interpretation of these sec-
tions that might place upon the Service the burden of demonstrating necessity
before a second examination would be allowed.' 5 Specifically, the Court re-
jected taxpayer's argument that section 7605 required the government to
"establish probable cause to suspect fraud.""' It reasoned that necessity was
not to be equated with probable cause even though the statute of limitations
on ordinary tax liability had run." When a fraud has been perpetrated, there
exists at all times a tax liability, which the Commissioner is authorized to
investigate under section 7602. 'While conducting this examination, the Com-
missioner could demand taxpayer's records if, "in order to determine the
existence or nonexistence of fraud in the taxpayer's returns, information in
the taxpayer's records is needed which is not already in the Commissioner's
possession."'" As a result, the Court in regard to Powell concluded that "the
examination is not 'unnecessary' within the meaning of Section 7605(b)." 1"
To require a probable cause showing might seriously hamper the government
in carrying out warranted investigations. The Commissioner would have to
9 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501(a).
10 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6501(c)(1), (2). Two other exceptions to the three year
statute of limitations are included in section 6501(c). Under section 6501(c) (3) a tax
may be assessed at any time if the taxpayer has failed to file a tax return and under
section 6501(c) (4), the period of limitation can be extended by agreement. Furthermore,
section 6501(e) extends the statute of limitations to six years "if the taxpayer omits from
gross income an amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 percent of
the amount of gross income stated in the return. . . ."
11 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605(6),
12 See DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85-86 (9th Cir. 1963).
13 Id. at 86.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7605(b); see DeMasters v. Arend, supra note 12.
15 United States v. Powell, supra note 1, at 51, 53-56.
16 Id. at 51.
17 Id. at 53-54.
18 Id. at 53.
79 Ibid.
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prove the reasonableness of his belief prior to the examination of the only
records which provide the ultimate truth."
Secondly, the Court grounded its interpretation of section 7605(b) on
legislative history.21 Reports of the congressional hearings do not intimate
"that Congress intended the courts to oversee the Commissioner's determina-
tions to investigate. No mention was made of the statute of limitations and
the exception for fraud."22 Section 7605(b) was enacted to protect the tax-
payer from repetitive and unnecessary examinations.23 However, the Court
found a "probable cause" interpretation unacceptable "without some solid
indication in the legislative history that such a gloss was intended." 24
Prior to this decision, judicial opinion had differed with respect to the
scope of the Service's investigative power. 25 The First and the Third Circuits,
in cases such as this, had interpreted the applicable sections of the Internal
Revenue Code as requiring the Commissioner to establish to the satisfaction
of the enforcing court that there was probable cause or a reasonable basis
for belief that the taxpayer had perpetrated a fraud. 26 They reasoned that
before the closing of the period of limitations, efficient and prompt enforce-
ment of the tax laws demanded that no stringent burden be placed upon the
Service.27 However, after the running of the statute of limitations on ordinary
tax liability, the equities were said to be reversed, and the interests of the
taxpayer were held to be paramount.28
 Any previous tax year became a
"closed year," reviewable only for fraud." If the taxpayer must "reach far
back into the past" to produce records which may have been lost or destroyed
or about which memories may have faded, his protection demanded that the
Commissioner establish the necessity of the examination by showing a reason-
able basis for his suspicion of fraud." Furthermore, it was believed that this
burden would not seriously hamper the government in conducting warranted
examinations. As was stated by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
O'Connor v. O'Connell:
• This does not mean that proof of fraud is required. It means only
that before the tax authorities are entitled to a district court order
enforcing a summons directing a taxpayer to testify as to a closed
20 Id. at 54.
21 Id. at 54-56.
22 Id. at 56.
23 Ibid,
24 Ibid. The Court gave a third reason for its interpretation of section 7605(b). "This
view of the statute is reinforced by the general - rejection of probable cause requirements
in like circumstances involving other agencies." Id. at 57.
25 See DeMasters v. Arend, supra note 12, at • 88 n.28; McDermott v.' John
Baumgarth Co., 286 F.2d 864, 866 (7th Cir. 1961); O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253
F.2d 365, 369 (1st Cir. 1958).
20 United States v. Powell, supra note 2; Lash v. Nighosian; 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir.
1960) ; O'Connor v. O'Connell, supra note 25.
27 See O'Connor v. O'Connell, supra note 25, at 369:noted in 10 Hastings L.J.
211 (1958).
	
- _
•28 Ibid.
20 United States v. Powell, supra note 2; O'Connor v. O'Connell, supra'note 25.
See Lash v. Nighosian, supra note 26.
a° O'Connor v. O'Connell, supra note 25, at 370.
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year they must establish to the district court's satisfaction that a
reasonable basis exists for a suspicion of fraud, or put another way,
that there is probable cause to believe that the taxpayer was guilty
of fraud in a statute barred year. (Emphasis added.)"
The majority of the circuits, however, did not require a probable cause
showing for a re-examination after the statute of limitations had run on
ordinary tax liability. 32
 While the standards adopted by the respective courts
of these circuits may have varied,33 the rationale adopted by all was the same
as that employed by the Powell Court."
A logical reading of the applicable sections of the Internal Revenue Code
calls for the decision handed down. Under section 7602, the Service is per-
mitted to re-examine the taxpayer's returns for the purpose of (1) ascertain-
ing the correctness of the returns and (2) determining the liability of the
taxpayer for any internal revenue tax. An examination for the purpose of
determining fraud falls within both of these jurisdictional requirements. Sec-
tion 6501(a), moreover, places no further restriction upon the Service. While
an assessment for an ordinary tax deficiency is precluded, a penalty upon the
finding of fraud is not. Section 6501(c) explicitly provides that a prosecution
for fraud is never barred. Finally, section 7605(b) imposes no restriction upon
the authority granted to the Service by sections 7602 and 6501. It is sub-
mitted that the Court was correct when it described section 7605(b) as for-
bidding merely the unauthorized investigation by low-echelon revenue agents
and commanding only the exercise of prudent judgment by all agents "in
wielding the extensive powers granted to them by the Internal Revenue
Code."35 The only purpose for this section is to protect the taxpayer against
"unnecessary" and repetitive examinations." There appears to be no intima-
31
 Ibid.
82 See United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 61
(1964); Foster v. United States, 265 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1959); Globe Constr. Co. v.
Humphrey, 229 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1956) ; United States v. United Distillers Prods.
Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946). But see Application of Magnus, 299 F.2d 335, 337
(2d Cir. 1962), where the court, while holding that a taxpayer had no standing to
institute an action to quash a summons compelling a third party to produce records,
stated "as to taxpayers, nothing said so far prevents them from enjoying the benefits of
the section [Section 7605]."
A third group of cases came out of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. While declining
to fix a standard, these circuits affirmed decisions of district courts enforcing administra-
tive summons on the grounds that a probable cause had been shown. Wall v. Mitchell,
287 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1961) ; McDermott v. John Eaumgarth Co., supra note 25.
33 See, DeMasters v. Arend, supra note 12 (investigation not "unnecessary" if the
decision to investigate was in fact reached as a matter of rational judgment). Foster
v. United States, supra note 32 (enforcement ordered if the examination "may shed
light on whether a liability still exists or whether it has been time-barred") ; Globe
Constr. Co. v. Humphrey, supra note 32 (no showing at all required).
84 Compare DeMasters v. Arend, supra note 12, with United States v. Powell,
supra note 1.
35 United States v. Powell, supra note 1, at 56.
36 See 61 Cong. Rec. 5855 (1921) (remarks of Senator Penrose); 61 Cong. Rec.
5202 (1921) (remarks of Congressman Hawley); 67 Cong. Rec. 3856 (1926) (a substan-
tial measure to meet the problem in the instant case was rejected).
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tion in the Code or legislative history 37
 that Congress intended to impose a
probable cause standard upon the Commissioner as a prerequisite to his re-
examination of the taxpayer's books of account after the statute of limitations
had run on an ordinary tax liability. As noted above, this was only the inter-
pretation given to section 7605(b) by certain of the circuits when confronted
with a problem identical to that presented by the Powell case."
The second factor that supports this decision can be found in an exam-
ination of the prevailing view concerning the scope of the investigatory powers
of the other administrative agencies.
During the formative years of the governmental agencies, the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures imposed
substantial restrictions upon all the agencies.'" Not only had the administra-
tor the burden of showing that the records summoned were relevant and
material to the purpose for which they were sought, but he also had the bur-
den of establishing that there was probable cause for the investigation." By
1946, however, this limitation had been eliminated." In that year, the Su-
preme Court, in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 42
 while sustaining
the constitutionality of the investigative power under Sections 9 and 11 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act, held:
The requirement of "probable cause" ... is satisfied . . . by the
court's determination that the investigation is authorized by Con-
gress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and the documents sought
are relevant to the inquiry. .. . 4 :`
Complete freedom was granted to the agencies in 1950 when the Court in
United States v. Morton Salt Co.," speaking of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, stated:
It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is
not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the
Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for
power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that
the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance
that it is not. (Emphasis added.) 45
Presently, "not a single important regulatory statute fails to provide broad
37
 Ibid.
38 Cases cited note 26, supra.
39
 Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum: Another
Look at CAB v. Hermann, 69 Yale L.J. 131, 132 (1959).
40 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); In re Andrews' Tax Liability, 18 F, Supp.
804 (D. Md. 1937). See Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces
Tecum, supra note 39; 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.12 (1958).
41
 See Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1940).
42
 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
48
 Id. at 209. 60 Stat, 1095 (1946), 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1958); 63 Stat. 916 (1949),
29 U.S.C. § 211 (1958).
44
 338 U.S. 632 (1950). See Administrative Procedure Act § 6(c), 60 Stat. 240
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(c) (1952).
45
 United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 44, at 642-43.
926
CASE NOTES
powers ... to compel production of evidence."" For example, the Antitrust
Civil Process Act enacted in 1962 gives the Attorney General the authority
to "issue in writing, and cause to be served upon . . . [a person] a civil in-
vestigative demand requiring such person to produce such material for exam-
ination."47
 Provision is also made for judicial enforcement of a summons
issued under this act. 48
 It appears, moreover, that all the Attorney General
must show is that the inquiry is one the Antitrust Division is authorized by
law to make, that the materials summoned are relevant to the authorized
inquiry, and that the disclosure sought is reasonable.4° Current judicial con-
struction, moreover, is not lacking. In 1962, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Goldberg v. Drivers Local Union No. 299, held that the
Secretary of Labor, pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act, did not
have to make a showing of probable cause to enforce a subpoena."
By its decision in the Powell case, the Court has accepted this prevailing
view and has aligned the Internal Revenue Service with the other federal
agencies. It read the Internal Revenue Code as imposing no standard of prob-
able cause upon the Commissioner to obtain enforcement of his summons in
fraud cases, either before or after the three year statute of limitations on
ordinary tax liabilities has expired.5 ' It also imposed upon the Service the
same burden as was placed upon other agencies in the Oklahoma Press case.
The Commissioner must show that the investigation will be conducted pur-
suant to a statutory purpose, that the administrative steps required by the
Code have been followed, and that the inquiry may be relevant to that pur-
pose.52
The Court, however, did not leave the taxpayer defenseless, but provided
a means by which he can force the court to inquire "into the underlying rea-
sons for the examination."53
 A few months prior to the Powell case, the Court,
in Reisman v. Caplin," decided for the first time that the taxpayer could
"challenge the summons on any appropriate ground."55
 All that the Court
demanded was that any action to enforce a summons issued under section
7602 must be commenced in a district court or before a United States Com-
missioner providing the taxpayer a judicial determination of any challenge to
40
 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 3.03 (1958).
47 Antitrust Civil Process Act, 76 Stat. 548, 15 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
48 76 Stat. 551, 15 U.S.C. § 1314 (Supp. V, 1964).
48 76 Stat. 548, 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. V, 1964):
(b) Each such demand shall—
(1) state the nature of the conduct constituting the alleged antitrust viola-
tion which is under investigation and the provision of law applicable
thereto;
(2) describe the class or classes of documentary material to be produced
thereunder . . . .
(c) No such demand shall—
(1) contain any requirement which would be held to be unreasonable
50
 293 F.2d 807 (6th Cir. 1961).
51
 United States v. Powell, supra note 1, at 56.
52
 Id. at 57-58. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7602.
53 Id. at 58.
54
 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
55
 Id. at 449.
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the summons." It is submitted that this Court has accepted and expanded
this holding. Under Powell, a proceeding to enforce the Commissioner's sum-
mons must be instituted pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by
filing a complaint followed by answer and hearing." At this time, if the tax-
payer raises a substantial question that an enforcement of the summons would
be an abusive use of the court's process, then according to the Court's hold-
ing, the government will have to make a showing of probable cause." The
taxpayer can meet the burden by showing that the summons had been issued
to "harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dis-
pute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular
investigation."53
ROBERT J. DESIDERIO
Antitrust—Sherman Act—Inducing State Officer To Enforce a Law—
Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank.'—Appellant, trustee of the Coffeyville Loan
and Investment Co., brought an action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act,2
alleging violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 3 Appellant
averred that the defendants had conspired, together with the Attorney
General of Arizona, fraudulently to place the Arizona Savings and Loan
Association in receivership under Arizona law, 4 as part of a scheme to restrain
and monopolize financial transactions in the area. The state receiver refused
to honor the appellant's contracts with Arizona Savings, thus limiting its
refinancing resources. The district court held that appellant failed to state
a cause of action upon which relief could be granted and dismissed the
action. Reversing, the Ninth Circuit HELD: Merely inducing a state officer
to enforce a law, regardless of the substantive merits of the enforcement,
is not prohibited by the antitrust laws; allegations of this enforcement,
however, either as part of a larger anti-competitive scheme or one in which
the state officer was a conspirator are sufficient to state a cause of action.
Although the Sherman Act prohibits "every" agreement designed to
monopolize trade, the Supreme Court has held that it applies only to "un-
reasonable" restraints on trade. 3 In determining unreasonableness the Court
66 Id. at 445-46.
57 United States v. Powell, supra note 1, at 58 n.18.
58 Id. at 51: "We reverse, and hold that the Government need make no showing of
probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer raises a substantial question . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
59 Id. at 58.
1 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
2 "Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . ." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
3 "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
. . is declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of [interstate or foreign] trade . . . shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor... ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958).
4 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-422, 423 (1956), as amended, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann,
§1 6-480, 481 (Supp. 1964).
5 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
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